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(2) is also dubious. If e must be caused by E (in whole or in part) in order
to be evidence for E, then if e* is to be evidence for God, it must be caused
by God. If God exists, this condition is trivially met, since everything other
than God is wholly or partly caused by him. That it is met isn’t sufficient
to regard his production of e* as part of God’s self-testimony, however. For
it is also necessary that God intentionally caused e* to serve as a sign of his
presence. Suppose both conditions are met. Are they jointly sufficient? Not
clearly. For it isn’t clear that God’s intentionally initiating certain evolutionary processes which he knew would eventually lead us to form theistic
concepts, and to interpret certain feelings and patterns as evidence of his
existence, would count as self-testimony. The remoteness of God’s act in
the causal chain seems to count against it, in any case, since “God disclosed
himself in an occurrence or pattern of occurrences, O,” at least contextually
implies that God is an immediate, or at least not too remote, cause of O.

The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy, from Antiquity through the Seventeenth Century, edited by Steven Nadler and T. M. Rudavsky. Cambridge
University Press, 2009, Pp. 904. £ 100 (hardcover).
JEROME GELLMAN, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
This volume includes twenty-three articles covering six main topics in Jewish philosophy from antiquity to the seventeenth century. The topics are: (1)
Texts and Contents, (2) Logic and Language, (3) Natural Philosophy, (4) Epistemology and Psychology, (5) Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, and
(6) Practical Philosophy. The editors have added a splendid “Biobliographical
Appendix,” consisting of a brief bio on each philosopher discussed in the
volume plus a list of his central writings. The articles are uniformly outstanding and well deserve reading by Christian philosophers. The central character in this volume is, naturally, Maimonides (Aquinas’s “Rabbi Moses”),
with Philo appearing as the first Jewish “philosopher” and Spinoza
closing the story in the seventeenth century. It is to the great credit of the
editors that they included Spinoza in the pantheon of Jewish philosophers.
While Spinoza may not have written an explicitly “Jewish” philosophy, this
volume well establishes that his thought lies on a continuum with Jewish
philosophy up until his day. In addition, Spinoza’s writings include polemics, explicit and implicit, against previous Jewish philosophers, chiefly
Maimonides. Placing Spinoza within Jewish philosophy helps to understand
the break that took place in the seventeenth century between traditional and
modern Jewish philosophy and serves as a bridge to Moses Mendelssohn’s
distinctly modern Jewish thought in the eighteenth century.
When reading this volume on the history of Jewish philosophy, a Christian
philosopher should keep in mind three factors that make the Jewish philosophical output truly remarkable. First, the Jews were a minuscule minority
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in the Gentile cultures in which they lived, mostly Christian Europe and
Muslim countries. Secondly, for much of the period covered by this volume,
the Jews were persecuted, or restricted, and/or living at the edge of expulsion and the threat of violence. Thirdly, Jewish philosophers, until modern
times, were not professional philosophers. They did not belong to orders,
could not join the faculties of medieval universities, and were not celibate
priests whose lives could center largely on their philosophical work. Many
were Rabbis of communities, some were physicians, some court advisors,
and others otherwise gainfully occupied. Maimonides, for instance, was
both a physician and head of the Jewish community of Fostat (old Cairo)
for many years. Jewish philosophers were married, with families, with little
kids running around in non-disposable diapers. Given these conditions,
the productivity of Jewish philosophers was far out of proportion to their
numbers and opportunities, both quantitatively and with regard to their
influence upon medieval and later philosophy. The results, as this volume
attests, are a monument to the Jewish dedication to learning and intellectual achievement.
In this brief review I will concentrate on those parts of the book likely to
be of most interest to readers of Faith and Philosophy. Alas, to my sorrow, I
must ignore much else that is worth reading. The section “Texts and Contexts” includes, among others, an article on the Greek context for Jewish
philosophy by Kenneth Seeskin, on the Muslim context by Sarah Strousma,
an article by Howard Kreisel on philosophy and the Hebrew Bible, and a
piece on “Mysticism and Philosophy” by Michael Gottlieb. Curiously, there
is no article on the Christian context of Jewish philosophy. Gottlieb’s article
focuses on Judah Halevi (ca. 1074–1141) and his distinction between the God
of the philosophers (“philosophy”) and the God of Abraham (“mysticism”),
and on what Gottlieb calls “Maimonides’ Apophatic Mysticism.” Philosophers who deal with mystical experience would do well to be acquainted
with this article to be better familiar with the neglected area of Jewish mystical experience (as opposed to the “mystical” metaphysics of the kabbalah
which receives a great amount of attention.)
Unfortunately, Gottlieb works with an inadequate definition of “mysticism,” which goes like this: “contact with the Divine, differing from the common religious experience cultivated in a certain religion both in intensity
and spiritual impact” (p. 122). This definition will not allow an atheist to
recognize the existence of a mystical experience. Furthermore, limiting mystical experience to theistic experience hinders the fruitfulness of comparing
theistic to non-theistic mysticism. Finally, “contact” with the Divine is much
too broad a category, since a traditional theist might well argue we are always in contact with the Divine. Here is a place where Jewish philosophy
would gain by becoming familiar with analytic studies of mysticism, as in
William Wainwright’s enduring book on mysticism (William Wainwright,
Mysticism [Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981]).
The section “Logic and Language” consists of three papers on propositions, reasoning, and semantics. The level is quite advanced and will be
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difficult for those without a good background in ancient logic and contemporary semantics. One may wonder why this section is included here
at all. What could be “Jewish” about a theory of propositions or semantics? The authors, Charles Manekin, Norbert Samuelson, and Josef Stern,
redeem this section by relating the technical issues to topics such as God’s
knowledge, or lack of it, of future contingents, to Maimonides’s theory
of language about God, and issues of “divine language” and signification. The question arises: “What came first? The theological chicken or
the logico-semantic egg?” Here is an agenda for further research into the
relationship between theology, on the one hand, and logic and semantics,
on the other, not only in Jewish philosophy, but in Christian and Islamic
philosophy as well.
The next section, on “Natural Philosophy,” deals with what we today
would call “science” and the “philosophy of science.” Of most interest here
is the article by Ari Ackerman on miracles. And in that article of most interest
is Maimonides’s views on miracles, including Maimonides’s deflation of the
epistemic value of miracles. God works miracles only for practical purposes
at hand, which do not include demonstrating the authenticity of a prophet,
even Moses. Miracles cannot authenticate a prophet since the suspicion always lurks that some magic trick or grand illusion is at play. To see the relevance of this to Jewish-Christian polemics, compare Jesus’s invoking of his
miracles in John 10:25 to establish his authority to (once censored) Talmudic
passages, in Shabbat 104b and Sanhedrin 107b, attributing nothing more than
magical manipulations to the Christian Savior. Much Jewish suffering would
have been avoided had Christians admitted that the position enunciated by
Maimonides, that miracles cannot establish a person’s authority, might be
the right one, rather than ascribing Jewish rejection of Christ to spiritual perversion or to the blindness of the synagoga.
Of great interest to readers of Faith and Philosophy will be the section
“Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology,” especially the outstanding
articles by Carlos Frankel on “God’s Existence and Attributes,” Steven
Nadler on “Theodicy and Providence,” and Seymour Feldman on “Divine
Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Human Freedom.” Frankel believes that
the soundness of Maimonides’s third argument for God’s existence, and
the one Maimonides cites as the proof of God’s oneness, assumes the past
eternity of the world. Therefore, argues Frankel, Maimonides must have
believed in the past eternity of the world, for otherwise he would have no
proof for God’s oneness.
But there is another way to look at this proof. That is that only its explicit
formulation depends upon the past eternity of the world. Implicitly, the
proof does not depend on past eternity. Maimonides wrote to the translator of his Guide for the Perplexed, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, in clarification of this
proof, that in an infinite amount of time every possibility is realized. Thus,
the explicit proof goes like this: If the world was past eternal, there was a
past time when no contingent objects existed, since that was a possibility, so
had to be realized at some point in the infinite past. But nothing begins to

BOOK REVIEWS

357

exist without a cause that already exists. So, there must be a necessary being that was the cause of the past renewed existence of contingent objects.
However, if we assume the world was not past eternal, Maimonides gets
an obvious parallel proof of God’s existence and oneness from principles
that Maimonides employs in his explicit argument. Here is the argument.
1. Assume: The world was not eternal in the past.
2. Therefore, there was a first contingent being (or: first contingent beings).
3. Nothing comes into existence without being caused to exist by something already in existence (Maimonides’s principle in his proof).
4. So the first contingent being was caused to exist by something already in existence.
5. That which caused the existence of the first contingent being could
not itself have been a contingent being.
6. Hence, there exists a necessary being that caused the first contingent
being to come into existence.
7. There cannot be an infinite series of necessary beings (from Maimonides’s proof).
8. So, there is one necessary being metaphysically the ground of all necessary and contingent beings.
This argument is so obvious given Maimonides’s principles, that I can
only assume that he believed that proving God and God’s oneness did not
depend on assuming the past eternity of the world, relying on combined
explicit and implicit arguments.
Nadler on “Theodicy and Providence” provides a rich study of the problem
of evil and providence in Jewish philosophy up to the modern era. Most
evident here is the naturalistic bent in the Jewish philosophers, starting with
Philo’s assertion that evil is to be explained by the need of a universal and
lawlike order (an idea that Richard Swinburne likes to stress), and continuing to Maimonides’s and Gersonides’s reticence to allow God to interfere
in earthly affairs. Spinoza follows with a strong critique of earlier Jewish
theodicies. Both Maimonides and Gersonides hold that most human beings
are given over to chance, with only the wise able to enjoy varying degrees of
divine protection from the vicissitudes of life. But even here, Nadler prefers
to say that they both strongly relate divine protection to the natural results
of the wise person’s living by his knowledge of the workings of reality.
Seymour Feldman, “Divine Omnipotence, Omniscience, and Human
Freedom,” presents a splendid survey of the thicket of views on this topic.
We find Gersonides (1288–1344) denying God’s knowledge of the future on
the grounds that omniscience entails knowing only everything it is logically possible to know. Future contingents have no determinate truth-value
and therefore God does not know what truth-value they will have. Gersonides’s position contrasts with that of Hasdai Crescas (ca. 1340–ca. 1410),

358

Faith and Philosophy

who Feldman carefully portrays as a “soft determinist” who sees no conflict between God’s timeless knowledge and human free will. Crescas is
often portrayed as a straight determinist, but Feldman’s careful exposition
shows this to be simplistic.
This is a good place to point out that unlike Christian philosophers until
modern times, Jewish philosophers did not have a Church institution to
contend with when writing their philosophies. There was no central Jewish
authority that could enforce purity of doctrine, and no central authority (as
opposed to a local authority, as Spinoza was to learn) to censure those who
might stray from the straight path. There was no straight path, at least in
the Catholic sense. This explains why there could be a bitter hundred years
controversy over the writings of Maimonides with no resolution. It also explains the wide latitude of views that can be found in the history of Jewish
philosophy, as evidenced in Feldman’s article. For example, you can find
in Orthodox Jewish thought everything from out and out “hard determinism” to panentheistic determinism to libertarian freedom, with no Church
censures in between.
Daniel Frank’s article on “Divine Law and Human Practices,” in the
section entitled “Practical Philosophy,” has what is perhaps the most intriguing idea in the book. Frank assimilates Maimonides’s views on idolatry to Plato’s cave allegory in The Republic, Book 7. Maimonides saw the
turn to idols as a deterioration from worship of God. People began with
God, and then gradually replaced the real thing, the abstract God, with
a concrete object that at first had served to represent or mediate God’s
presence, and then came to be worshipped on its own. Idolatry therefore
serves those who find it difficult to go beyond the concrete to the abstract
idea of God. Frank elaborates, convincingly, what he sees here as a borrowing from Plato’s allegory of the cave. Ensconced in that cave are those
unable to get beyond the concrete to gaze on the Forms themselves. They
are limited to sense-experience. While Maimonides did not see the world’s
objects as copies or instantiations of Forms, he does portray idol worshippers as confusing the sensible with the divine, because of an inherent disability. Here is a fertile place to ponder anew the extent of Plato’s influence
on Maimonides, as opposed to his famous Aristotelianism. Such might
shed more light on the debate between Maimonides’s scholars as to what
extent Maimonides was a card-carrying Aristotelian, or diverged into Platonic and Neo-Platonic paths.
Frank zeroes in on Spinoza’s critique of Maimonides over biblical interpretation. He portrays Spinoza as being against Maimonides reading
science and metaphysics into the Bible, interpreting Spinoza as one who
sees only law as the purpose of the revelation. Frank then defends Maimonides against Spinoza as one who sees the Bible leading beyond the
law to knowledge and love of God.
I fear that Frank might have missed an important point in Spinoza’s
critique. The problem is not only whether the Bible’s business is solely
law. Rather, Spinoza argues from his endorsement of a favored principle
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of biblical exegesis, namely, that the author of a biblical text wrote exactly
what he meant, and nothing should be read into the text that is not there,
whether other than law or law itself. Spinoza wields this principle not
only against Maimonides for seeing physics and metaphysics in the Bible,
but against the ancient rabbis as well for reading in legal content that is
not there. Spinoza here means to attack the entire notion of a tradition of
reading Scriptures that departs from the obvious meaning of the written
word, a notion so vital to Judaism and Catholicism. He aims to replace
tradition with “reason.”
After reading this volume, a Christian philosopher could well conclude
that Jewish philosophical sources should be part of the standard curricula
in the philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Focusing exclusively on Christian philosophers, as some of us philosophers of religion
do, excludes rich theistic philosophizing concerning the major issues in
philosophy of religion of interest to Christian philosophers. The adding of
Jewish resources into such courses would also accurately reflect the spirit
of religious camaraderie and respect that a Jewish philosopher such as
myself enjoys within the precincts of the Society of Christian Philosophers.

Introducing Apologetics: Cultivating Christian Commitment, by James E.
Taylor. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2006. ISBN 080102786.
$34.99 (cloth).
PAUL J. GRIFFITHS, Duke Divinity School
To engage in apologetics is to do one of two things: to offer a reasoned, verbal defense against a real or imagined attack; or to offer a reasoned, verbal
attack upon a rival, real or imagined. We might call the former negative
apologetics and the latter positive apologetics. What might be defended
or attacked? In theory, almost anything (yourself, someone’s character, the
United States of America, the appropriateness of genocide, the activity of
smoking, the truth of Goldbach’s Conjecture), but most often some set of
views or claims. Why might such defenses or attacks be offered? Again,
the possibilities are endless, but usually negative apologetics is concerned
to show why some argumentative attack upon some claim(s) fails, while
positive apologetics is concerned to show the superiority of some claim(s)
over some among (or even all) its possible rivals. The negative apologist
adopts the beleaguered boxer’s defensive crouch, parrying the opponent’s
blows; the positive apologist goes for the knockout. These two modalities
of the apologetical enterprise are often inseparably mixed in the writing or
speech of particular apologists; but it is useful to distinguish them nonetheless, because they have a different grammar, which means that criticisms or recommendations that might reasonably be taken to apply to one
mode won’t always (or usually) apply to the other.

